Процеси міжнаціонального примирення лежать в основі формування єдиної Європи та сприяють зміцненню безпеки і стабільності.

Ключові слова: *польсько-українське примирення, польсько-українські відносини, Центрально-Східна Європа.*

Польско-украинское примирение предполагало решение нескольких проблем: конструирование новой системы международных отношений в Центрально-Восточной Европе, решение проблемы границ, либерализации политики в отношении национальных меньшинств и преодоление межнациональных стереотипов. Польско-украинское примирение произвело положительное влияние на геополитические и демократические трансформации Центрально-Восточной Европы. Польско-украинское примирение является примером положительного решения сложного межнационального конфликта. Процессы межнационального примирения лежат в основе формирования единой Европы и способствуют укреплению безопасности и стабильности.

Ключевые слова: *польско-украинское примирение, польско-украинские отношения, Центрально-Восточная Европа.*

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DOMINANT VECTORS IN THE GEOPOLITICAL DOCTRINE OF MODERN RUSSIA: ANALYSIS OF THE EXPERIENCE OF THE MID-2000S.

The main line of the foreign policy of Russia in the mid-2000s combined reality and pleasure principles that have been antagonistic in this case. Selected geopolitical strategy predetermined its own unpredictability and depreciation. Conceptually allowed signs were completely incompatible in practice.

Keywords: *foreign-policy strategy, geopolitical priorities, geopolitics of Russia, geostrategic players, geopolitical axis.*

To be and to look are complementary tasks, and since they are also multi-vector goals, the efforts to implement each of these principles are often unequivalent and happend to be mutually contradictory. Art "to look" has been investigated comprehensively but not thoroughly enough. The ability to comply with the stated strategy in domestic and especially foreign policy had also seen attempts to implement with greater or lesser success by politicians at different levels and in different times. Certainly, the higher crisis degree of geopolitical system, the more subtle diplomat must act, in other words, these concepts are directly proportional.

Jean Baudrillard focused on "simulation of actual reality", Guy Debord investigated a "performance society", and Paul Virilio analyzed "substitution of the actual reality by virtual reality". Despite of each of these researchers own conclusions, their findings have some common ground. It is the position that the visibility of the power, its everyday technologies and incarnations leads to a paradoxical result: "The more the power shows itself the more it is hidden, elusive and has hidden itself better" [8, p.14], the art "to look" is highly polished.

The might of symbolic power which is based on the symbolic capital, reveals itself in the nature of structuring social reality on the basis of consensus on a particular vision of the world, and legitimation of the appropriate cognitive order. Task to force everybody to see and believe the "right" things, to hear certain words, in this case is absolutely necessary to

implement for the bearers of such power. It is sometimes too intrusive encouraging people to change their perception of the world. Moreover, as an option, such a government can itself create divrgences between the various components of social reality largely articulating them, making them "visible and obvious"[9, p.166]. And the way described is a method of structuring society, social groups and interests, values and ideas.

To change or keep the existing social order is possible through change or conservation of the form of its perception by the people, and their practicle activity on reproducing of the social life (using Pierre Bourdieu's terminology, one needs to change or retain the habit). "Symbolic power is exercised not as conscious acts but indirectly - by means of its reflection, evaluation and actions which are constituted by the totality of dispositions that shape perceptions and peoples' worldview guidelines, and therefore are beyond the level of consciousness and volitional control" [9, p.27]. "Developing further this point of view we note that the aggregate of social space dispositions in order to continue to exist or change over time speaks to us by means of the ideological code because ideology actualizes itself only through habit. These systems provide unity of agreed dispositions, and a kaleydoskopic diversity of its products forms a circle whose center is everywhere and nowhere" [2, p.58].

Today's ideology is an instrument, goal and sometimes force majeure. Each of the characteristics can become an integral feature. It is no longer a means of struggle of real clearly defined groups for the power localized in the social space but a structure that allows the true power of social space to be accomplished, and to be structured and continually delimited. No localizability, no subjectivity and totality of power in modern society play into the hands of ideology that due to such circumstances acquires universal features of social integrator which organizes society, constitutes society actors and sets the configuration of relations between them.

At various stages of state-building Russia powerfully implements multifaceted potential of ideology as a tool to strengthen its own legal personality as geopolitical player. Yes, ideological resource has always been extremely important in implementing Russia's strategies in various configurations of international relations. One of the most common and most significant for Russia ideologemes is the status of this country as a "cradle of Slavic peoples." This provided an opportunity to enhance their own power through geopolitical position, historical past and lead the geopolitical trend of Pan-Slavism thus ideologically subjugation Slavic ethnic groups. In fact, the myth of Russia's Slavdom is more just a myth, profanation than reality. But "during the colonization of the north-eastern areas (which later became part of Russia, such as Novgorod land), the number of Slavic-Russian burials in the X century was only 12%, and Finnish - 75%, Scandinavian - 13%. In the XII century this figure has changed in the direction of increasing of the Slavic element in it up to 24%, however included 72.5% of Finnish and 3.5% of Scandinavian burials" [5, p. 25].

It is pertinent to add Sergei Esenin comments in his own words: "Rus' got lost in Mordva and Chud." At the same time V. Kliuchevskii more carefully while ironically remarked "great-Russian face does not fully reproduce common Slavic features". And it may surprise one because unlike the Slavic haplogroup DNA R1a, haplogroup of those who now claims themselves "Russians" is in fact Finnish - N1s. As stated V. Byelinskyy, the real masters of the Rostov-Suzdal and Muscovy principalities from 1238 to 1357 were ethnic Mongolians. Batu Khan (Sain) from 1238 to 1250, Sartak Khan (1250-1257), Berke Khan (1257-1266), Meng-Timur Khan (1266-1282), Meng-Tuda Khan (1282-1287), Talabuha Khan (1287-1290), Tohta Khan (1291-1312), Uzbek Khan (1312-1332), Djanibek Khan (1342-1357) [1, p. 187].

Elaborating the idea, we should add that the father of Alexander Nevsky - Yaroslav Vsevolodovich - a descendant of the Ruriks of Kiev - did not resist the invaders, for which he

was honored to become the holder of the so called "yarlyk" (or jarlig, mongol., also yarlyk - a term used in the historiography for khan of the Golden Horde decree) to the Grand Prince's throne. In 1238 he participated in the coronation of the new ruler Guyuk Khan in the capital of the empire Karakorum [1, p.86]. By the Horde's law son of Yaroslav - Alexander (later - Nevsky) was a hostage. This means that from an early age, he always lived in the Great Khan's headquarter, where he found a friend - future blood brother and at the same time - a descendant of the grandson of Batu Khan - Sartak. He was a full member of the Great Khan's family and later on a statesman one of the empire's parts - the Golden Horde.

It is also known that in 1325, Ivan Kalyta - the fourth son of Danylo, the son of Alexander Nevsky, became the new prince of Moscow, whose name is also associated with "gathering of Russian" lands when not Sarai but Moscow wins the right to be a uniting administrative center [1, p. 65]. Given so called "yarlyk" - a deed - to collect tribute from Russian Ulus, Ivan Kalyta laid his hands on most of the former Kyiv Rus land, increasing its ownership six times: in 1468 he annexed Novgorod, in 1485 Tver surrendered under the blows of Muscovites, in 1489 - Vyatka land did, in 1510 Moscow subjugates Pskov, in 1514 - Smolensk, in 1520 - Ryazan. His name is also associated with strengthening the church. He relieved the church from tax so boosting its influence. Fusion of orthodoxy with Mongol authorities was so fast that in 1261 Metropolitan Kirill already founded episcopal chair in the capital city of Golden Horde - Sarai. and Bishop Vassian of Sarai returned it back to Moscow only in the middle of the XV century [1, p. 163].

Muscovy strengthened with the support of the Mongols. As part of the Mongol Empire, it was a semi-autonomy - "Russian Ulus", and so called "yasak" - a tribute to Khan - was a form of a state tax. In the Tatar army served many Ugro-Finns and Tatar-Muscovites, considerable part of whom lived and traded in the capital of the Golden Horde - Sarai, where metropolitan department of the Russian Orthodox Church was also moved in 1261. These facts confirm that Sarai was not only political but also spiritual and religious center of the Mongol Empire.

Some place names are informative to confirm mutual influence of Muscovites and Mongols. For example, Tula - the city named after the Mongolian queen Thai Dhula, wife of Chanibek Khan. As for Moscow, the first known reference to Moscow dates from 1147 seems to be a forgery of historians, which under the direction of Catherine II laid the first chronicles, thus preparing the ground for a new history of the Russian state, still again implementing tasks "to be" and "to look". Manipulating dates and sometimes the names and denominations made it possible to fade away the role of the Mongols at initial stage of the state of Muscovites. In fact, the first mention of Moscow dates from 1272 (during the census, launched by the Mongols), and the next one from 1277 (as presented to son Alexander Nevsky - Danylo when he reached adulthood).

Thus, the formation of Muscovy begins with capturing in 1301 city of Kolomna, well geographically located at the Kama-Oka watershed, by Danylo, son of Alexander Nevsky - the first prince of Moscow. It opened out an access to a strategic space - Oka-Volga river basin. Since then, Moscow had a direct waterway to the capital of the Horde - Sarai. After a while territory of the Moscow principality has doubled [6, 132]. By 1368, when the Mongol rule in China fell, Moscow had become an administrative part of the Kipchak kingdom of Uzbek Khan Yu-Ju Bu state, and made part of the Jochi Ulus [4, p. 161].

The feature of the process of conquest was excessive cruelty, compared to which even the Mongol raids were peaceful consensuses. This, for example, illustrates the fact of destruction of Novgorod in 1570, the first attempt to annex which was made by Ivan III at one time in 1478. Ivan the Terrible convicted people of Novgorod of treason and the desire to unite with Poland and Lithuania and that was the reason to start the war. The defeat of Novgorod lasted six weeks, historians testify about numerous examples of brutal torture at the

time. In the end, the tsar arrested Metropolitan Pimen, confiscated the property of Novgorod monasteries and property of local merchants [3, p. 117].

Further in 1317, Uzbek Khan of Horde gave his sister to marry Prince Yuri Dolgoruky, also gave him "yarlyk" and the right to reign in the former capital of Zalissia - the city of Vladimir-on-Klyazma. At the same time, younger Danylo's brother Ivan, nicknamed Kalyta already receives "yarlyk" from Uzbek Khan and the right to collect tribute for him from all Russians (Zalessky) lands. As a sign of honour Kalyta receives Uzbek's gift - expensive golden cap, the one which is now known as the "cap of Monomakh" and which became a symbol of the transfer of the Mongol power into the hands of Moscow prince, but it is quite clearly not about the transfer of power from Monomakh's kin of Byzantine to Muscovites.

It is worth to clearly define the form of cohabitation of Ugro-Finns and Tatars. This is not the "yoke" or "Tatar yoke" but peaceful coexistence. For permanent armed struggle was basically khans and princes struggle for personal power. And for this conclusion clearly testifies Mamai's Bloody Battle as well as the phenomenon of Mamai itself, against which Moscow acted not because they wanted to separate, and that he was not Genghisides, therefore did not belong to the top of the Khan's power.

The following facts complement the picture. In 1571, the Crimean Girays almost completely destroyed Moscow after which it had been decided to remain in alliance with them. The act of renunciation by Ivan the Terrible title of king in 1574 became the illustration of his lack of rights to be the first in the Horde in the future. Justifying he claimed that if Kazan became part of Muscovy, once donated by the Mongols, then the title of king also must be reserved for the descendant of Genghis Khan namely Sain-Bulat Khan, not for Ivan the Terrible. So under the pressure Crimean Khan, Muscovy directs implementation of its plans for domination in the Horde, from South to North. In 1577 the Tatar forces already participated in the Livonian War on the side of Muscovy. The Moscow troops contained Kasym Tatars, Bulgar Tatars, Tula Tatars, princes Shevkalski, Mordvinic, Circassian, princes and former nobleman of the Astrakhan and the Kazan Hordes [1, p. 322].

A number of Russian historians, including M. Karamzin (1766-1826) and M. Pokrovsky (1868-1932) acknowledged that in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, 57% of the top layer of Muscovy were of Tatar origin. In particular, Boris Godunov who reigned after the son of Ivan the Terrible - Theodore, was an ethnic Tatar. Tatars were also princes Khovanskii, Yusupov, Urusov, Saltykov, Ordino-Naschekin, Mansurov, Sumbatov, nobles Arhalukov, Alimanov, Arakcheev, Aksakov, Akhmatova, Aslanbekov, Artanov, Arhamakov, Armyakov, Ahmetyev, Arabazhyn, Arbatov, Baskakov, Burdyukov, Behmetyev , Burnakov, Barabanov, Beklemishevo Bazarov, Bakcheyev, Barhanov, Balahanov, Berendeyev, Bakunin, Barsanov and others [7, p. 12].

A basic core element of the Sergei Radonezhskii's "Holy Russia" project is so obvious that the concept could be a classic myth creating of the kind. Still later on that very concept appeared as an effective mechanism of self-organization of a new Moscow civilization, laid the foundations of a new Russian Tatar-Russian ethnicity, gave Muscovites civilizational greatness, made the Russian ethnos a world culture phenomenon. This was the foundation for further superstructure.

If one analyzes the situation in the mid-2000s, Russia was trying to comprehend both civilizational ethnicity - European and Asian. The task seemed utopian and even partially illogical. Among commentators of the situation the point of view of political scientist Vyacheslav Nikonov is quite reasonable. He said that Rassia is too big in terms of territory and especially in terms of Russian mentality to become "one of the many", a regular part of NATO or any other bloc. Obviously, such a state must surely be if not the "first among equals" then at least on the first cast. It is difficult not to note that this position is a logical

incentive for foreign activity and even active aggression of today's Russia, its positions and state strategy.

Analyzing Asian geopolitical vector, there exist at least a few objects of international politics which may reasonably question the dominance or even prospects of Russia in Asia. First of all, it's crowded China, whose economy since the early 2000s is under active development, and which Napoleon called "the sleeping giant". In fact, China almost had never been in the state of hibernation. And specifically during the period from 1879 to 1889 China in terms of trade was second only to the UK.

Potential of China requires detailed and thorough analysis through the lifetime of this civilization. In the aftermath of the Opium Wars China is being associated with the names of such intellectuals as Hunchzhan Li, Zeng Guofang and Liang Tsichao that substantiated in details the path of political reform and the "awakening of China". At the beginning of the XX century China was already "awakened" by Sun Yat-sen, Li Dachzhao, Mao Zedong and others. At the end of XX century personality Deng Xiaoping once again proved that China entered a new stage of development. Virtually during every era, since the time of Confucius, China had distinct thinkers and reformers.

China's political system stability for about three thousand years is also an argument. There is no state religion of rescue that could help deal with the present or to give the keys to heaven and eternity. It is no accident the fundamental book of Chinese thought is considered the I Ching - Book of Changes. It contains a phrase which summarizes this perception of reality: the only constant thing is changes.

The idea of "Global China" is the universal effectiveness of the Chinese model. The idea of "Global China" lies down in the universal effectiveness of the Chinese model. The main principles of the Chinese dream are the following "something that has origins in China", "belongs to China" and "been made in the name of China". The main element is the idea of "belongs to China", which is conceptualized as a trinity with "Asian dream" and "global dream". There is also a determined logic of the process: you must first accomplish the idea of "Chinese China" - i.e. in the development of the dream of worldwide socialism to build socialism with Chinese peculiarities. The idea of "Asian China" is to avoid Asia diving into destructive Western influence.

Assessing the prospects of a dominant role of China in geopolitics as an Asia's reprezentative, lets note that the country is past the stage of economic growth, which was based on cheap labor and is at Lewis' turning point - that is, when lack of labor force replaces its surplus. This is a serious challenge for the economies of overtaking, because from that point they can no longer rely not only on cheap labor, but also technology copying and growth based on exports. The situation has further growth prospects provided economics adapts to new circumstances.

As for the future of Russia, there are options and sometimes conflicting scenarios. One might reasonably prove future hypothetical disintegration of the Russian Federation, as is done, for example, in the 2004 report of the CIA. On the other hand, Russia is both geographically and ideologically powerful geopolitical player for centuries which has experience in not only survival but more or less the dominance as a result of use of the principles of "soft power", and real aggression through negotiations and blackmail.

It is important that there are much more negative scenarios than there are positive ones. The range of negative forecasts is extremely lengthy. First reduction of the population is mentioned (148.6 million - in 1993, 140.2 million - in 2012). An important factor is the rapid aging, low life expectancy and the deterioration of public health, and now it's sanctions and hard to reliably forecast tomorrow. There is also an important territorial and demographic aspect, in particular, the growth of non-Russian population - primarily Muslims. And this is about different religion, values and objectives.

Extensive economy based on exports of raw materials, especially oil and gas also does not add dominant influence, especially in the case of oil prices fluctuating towards their reduction. In addition, the role of alternative energy sources as ecological and renewable increases while becoming commensurate by the cost. Russia's raw materials reserves seem huge, but under the conditions of maintaining the recent years level of oil production it will last for less than 20 years.

It should also be noted that modern Russia, same as Russia of the mid-2000s is one of the most corrupt countries in the world. An important negative factor for the future of this state is also low modernization potential. Today too powerfull efforts aimed at implementing the principle of"fun",i.e. to achieve the goal-"to look". And the goal of "reality" is practically leveled to solve the problem of "to be".

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Головна лінія зовнішньої політики Росії в сер. 2000-х рр комбінувала принципи реальності і задоволення, які були антагоністичними в цьому випадку. Відібрана геополітична стратегія зумовила свою власну непередбачуваність і амортизацію. Концептуально дозволені ознаки були повністю несумісні на практиці.

Ключові слова: *зовнішньополітична стратегія, геополітичні пріоритети, геополітика Росії, геостратегічні гравці, геополітична вісь.*

Основным направлением внешней политики России середины 2000-х годов были объединенные принципы реальности и удовольствия, которые в данном случае были антагонистическими. Выбранная геополитическая стратегия обусловила собственную непредсказуемость и обесценивание. Концептуально допустимые признаки были совершенно несовместимыми на практике.

Ключевые слова*: внешнеполитическая* стратегия, геополитические приоритеты, геополитика России, геостратегические игроки, геополитическая ось.