Российский контекст политики ЕС в отношении Украины: украинский взгляд на проблему

Abstract

The victory of the Orange Revolution led to an increase in the EU support for Ukraine. At the same time, the process of transformation and enlargement of the European Union in 2004 and 2007, more significant progress on the European way of the Western Balkan countries, and the financial and economic crisis of 2008 – 2009 hindered the European “breakthrough” of Ukraine. The situation was further complicated by an inability of the leading European capitals to retreat from implementing policies in Eastern Europe based on “Russia first” principle. Even after Russia’s aggression in Georgia in August 2008 the situation has not changed essentially. As a consequence, we can observe a dualism in framework of the EU’s Eastern European policy within researched period: Brussels steps aimed at supporting Ukraine were made in parallel with the realization of elements of the modern “policy of appeasement” concerning Russia. Accordingly, we can eventually say that during the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, on the basis of the complex processes that took place in the EU and the dualism of relations in the Brussels-Kiev-Moscow triangle, Ukraine managed to achieve moderate success in terms of approaching the European Union.